

Climate Emergency and Welfare States



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This political brief develops arguments for an urgent evolution of European welfare states. We point out that, to answer the new climate emergency-related risks citizens face, welfare states should be reinvented and expanded.

We suggest a set of concrete political proposals that can lead the way, ranging from the systematic decarbonisation of existing welfare state infrastructures, to funding of an additional European welfare state sector, to new directives, new forms of European coordination, and the establishment of an EU monitoring body.

The proposals have all been selected for their feasibility and implementability during the next European legislature, as well as for their potential to spark public and political debates.

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Introduction

Following the 2015 Paris Agreement, the EU has set itself ambitious targets for reducing its greenhouse gas emissions. This necessitates the adoption of a wide range of public policies in sectors as varied as energy, industry, agriculture, housing, transport and spatial planning. It also requires the use of a diverse range of instruments: regulation, standards, taxation, subsidies, investment, aid to affected regions and populations, soft law, etc.

Recent data shows that significant progress has been made, even if it has been uneven and insufficient. It has been particularly visible in industry and the renewable energy sector, though much less so in transport, housing and agriculture. The efforts still needed in these latter areas, especially, will have major repercussions in terms of inequalities and lifestyle. One of the associated issues that come up in public debates is the rising energy poverty in Europe, but this is not the only challenge. Mobility issues (not confined to electric vehicles) will also become increasingly important, for example, as the reactions of the Yellow Vests movement have clearly shown.

This next phase of the transition comes at a time when the consensus around the European Green Deal (EGD) seems to be crumbling, with the predominantly populist parties of the right and centre-right highlighting the costs for the poorest populations and turning these into a reason to put the brakes on the transition. The inequalities in terms of both emissions and the impacts of change have become a central issue that is being instrumentalised to stop rapid climate action. This is a dangerous narrative, as it will worsen the longer-term effects on the very populations that are already being, and will continue to be, hit hardest by the climate crisis: the poorest. We urgently need a framing that can build a strong enough consensus against this stance.

This is where the concept of the welfare state comes in. The potential for social protection to accompany the changes and thereby reduce social tensions needs to be put at the forefront of the political debate. In order to achieve this, a clear approach is necessary: climate policy and welfare state policy have to be advanced in a mutually reinforcing way. A key question here will be how the welfare state can on the one hand protect people from climate risks and damages, and on the other enable them to mitigate those risks. Even more specifically: what role could social protection play in reducing greenhouse gases and ensuring the fairest possible transition?

The report of the 2023 High Level Group on the future of social protection and the welfare state in the EU emphasises that *“Achieving climate neutrality and environmental sustainability will only be possible if accompanied by measures to support those groups hit by the green transition, including by bridging disparities, not least because those for whom the transition will be hardest are those with the lowest level of emissions.”* Its authors focus on a limited number of issues, such as employment and energy poverty. However, if we look at the different types of social protection, we see that the impacts of both the climate crisis and the transition are far more numerous and varied.

To give just a few examples:

- Health (junk food, transport emissions, new illnesses, ...)
- Pensions (deaths due to pollution, heatwaves, ...)
- Employment (restructuring, green jobs, relocation, migration, ...)
- Training/education (reskilling, upskilling)
- Poverty (energy, food, transport, ...)
- Health and safety (chemicals, Seveso plants, external/internal pollution)
- Housing (retrofitting, energy poverty, cost)

The aim of this political brief is not to provide a detailed analysis of the issues involved – this has already been done in a number of recent publications (e.g. Galgoczi & Pochet, 2022, 2023; Nenning et al., 2023; Schoyen & Hvinden, 2017) – but to propose actions to bring about changes in European and national public policies. These proposals are not intended to be exhaustive, but have been selected for their feasibility and implementability during the next European legislature (other more radical though also interesting ideas are not discussed here). In the following sections we will first briefly assess the current state of play and then develop a number of proposals grouped into three main clusters.

State of play

Conceptual overview

There is significant commonality between the literature on the welfare state and the literature on the environmental state (see Gough, 2016, for example). Both address the issue of capitalism and ways of taming it (decommodification/post-growth/well-being), as well as major challenges such as inequality, intergenerational solidarity, redistribution and poverty. Their shared aim is to ensure social stability so as to reduce the risk of societal collapse. The two approaches find a synthesis in the form of an eco-social state (or eco-social policies), though the exact form will vary from author to author.


Despite this, the role of the welfare state in dealing with the environmental crisis has not yet received sufficient academic or political attention. Studies, though increasing in number and quality, are still scattered and incomplete. Until recently, most discussions about the links between welfare states and the climate emergency have remained general: they focus on the need for transition/transformation and deliver the rationale for moving toward an eco-social welfare state, but usually lack macroeconomic analysis (budgetary impacts, costs, financing, etc.). As Mandelli (2022) writes in his review of the literature, *“eco-social policies in the literature: [are still] a predominantly normative field”*.

One of the complicating factors is the existence of multiple different readings of the welfare state. The objectives assigned to social protection vary enormously, depending on the authors and policymakers concerned: examples include addressing poverty, reducing primary inequalities, exiting the market (decommodification), protecting the wealthiest from social revolt, facilitating change, and fostering capabilities.

And these varying approaches can also be found when it comes to ecological transitions. The different schools of thought can in this case be situated along the axes of growth versus post-growth and degrowth, and of technological innovation versus behavioural change.

In 2018, for example, Sabato and Mandelli proposed structuring the various approaches as follows:

Figure 1. Importance attached to economic growth in five approaches to ecological transitions (source: Sabato and Mandelli, 2018)



Going back to the nexus between the two (i.e. ecological transition and welfare states), the same authors (2023) have identified four functions of a welfare state in terms of the environment:

1. benchmark for the green transition (normative dimension);
2. enabler of policy programmes and instruments;
3. buffer for policy programmes and instruments;
4. consensus builder/ conflict management tool (procedural dimension).

More recently Nenning, Bridgen, Zimmermann, Büchs and Mesiäislehto (2023) have grouped scholars' contributions to the debate under the following five headings: Adaptive Social Protection, Just Transition, Green New Deal, Post-growth, and Eco-feminism. They point out that each of these approaches has its own reading of the causes and remedies as well as of the main actors involved: "Our analysis suggests that the new social protection norms proposed by scholars in different policy frameworks are shaped by their understandings of the climate crisis and the role of capitalist growth, as well as the geographical and actor political context within which they were developed."

Finally, Galgoczi and Pochet (2023), drawing on the four French scenarios developed by Ademe (2022), apply the technology-behaviour axis of ecological transitions to welfare states. They argue that ecological transitions in practice ultimately involve a mix of technology and changes in collective and individual behaviour, but in highly variable combinations depending on the approach.

In a scenario in which technology plays the key role, the restructuring process towards a zero-carbon economy creates its own risks that need to be managed. This approach can co-opt conventional instruments of the welfare state and the conventional repertoire of public policies. However, in a scenario that goes beyond technology and focuses on bringing human activity back within the limitations of the planet, our entire model of production and consumption will require a fundamental, paradigmatic shift (Laurent, 2021).

The prospect of an eco-social state implies a whole new framework for welfare state policy, one that goes beyond current mainstream academic and political debates. In terms of the politics and actors involved, it is much easier to make incremental modifications to existing public policies (as in the first scenario with its focus on technology) than it is to completely redesign them (as in the second, more systemic scenario) or even redesign the objectives and structure of the welfare state as a whole. The two approaches are not wholly incompatible, however: they can be used transitionally, starting with the first and then moving on to the more radical but necessary second one (see Gough, 2017 or Laurent & Pochet 2015 for this type of scenario).

We conclude this short conceptual overview by highlighting major points of convergence identified in the recent literature. Firstly, the climate emergency is conceived in different ways and the related proposed responses of the welfare state reflect the way in which the problems and solutions are understood. Secondly, public policy proposals are still incomplete and require further research.

Political consequences

In the light of the latest literature, it should come as no surprise that the current political context lacks any sense of direction when it comes to transforming the welfare state to enable it to deal with the climate emergency.

Political action can be divided into three stages: framing (what is the main problem, what is the main aim?), public policy (what are the options, what are the possible solutions?), and governance (how can the various interests be managed, how can the solutions be implemented?). The EU debate about the role of the welfare state in dealing with the climate emergency is still mostly at stage one. The current thinking focuses on how the question should be formulated and the possible discursive articulation between social and ecological policies. As shown above, there are a number of proposals that attempt to present the diversity of the framing and ways of thinking about the challenge. However, the public policy implications in terms of options and solutions are rarely discussed in detail: specific policy proposals tend to be fairly limited and poorly articulated, more like wishful thinking than in-depth analysis. The crucial governance aspect finally, which includes the key issue of identifying the main players and the power relationships between them, is rarely addressed and needs to be explored further.


Reflections on the state of play

Having discussed the various ways of framing the issues (stage 1), let us now move on to the question of options (stage 2) and the locus of action, and consider the role that could be played at the European level, both economically and socially (stage 3).

Financial challenges

Studies show the need for massive investment in the transition. According to the latest IEA report (2023), new clean energy investment needs to be three times higher than its current level, which is itself already at a record high. Progressing to stages 2 and 3 will therefore require a resolution to the trilemma illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2: The current trilemma



There is an institutional trilemma¹ between the need to preserve the welfare state, investments in the green transition, and the stringent European focus on fiscal consolidation. The latter is currently hindering efforts in the other two, resulting in clearly documented spending gaps (see for example by I4CE, Bizien et al., 2024).

This obsession with fiscal consolidation shows little sign of changing. Bruegel (Pisany-Ferry et al., 2023), for example, show that the current spending deficit will, on the contrary, increase from 2025/2026, even with the contribution of the Social Climate Fund from 2026 onwards. The current situation is simple: if things continue as they are now, not only will the lack of investment render the transition impossible, but the resulting climate impacts will lead to an increase in social tensions, since there will be no meaningful financial compensation for those most affected, let alone a systemic reduction of inequalities.

The revision of the budgetary rules for the Stability and Growth Pact was a huge missed opportunity in this respect, but the forthcoming mid-term Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) negotiations and preparations for the next MFF term (2028-2034) will give policymakers another chance to do what is needed.

Emerging developments and opportunities

Despite some noteworthy developments in European social policy in recent years (see the special issue of *Transfer*, Keune & Pochet, 2023, for example), a cursory glance might lead one to the conclusion that interest in welfare state issues hasn't followed this evolution. One of the traditional arguments is that the welfare state is essentially a national issue and that the European Union can do little beyond coordinating national systems.

This is not wholly untrue, but there are also other signs that suggest that some things have moved on. As Miro and colleagues (2023) point out, the last 15 years have seen the emergence of a series of innovations at the European level which have created new interactions between European policy and national welfare states in terms of easing the costs of the green transition. These innovations include the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund (EGF), the Youth Guarantee (YG), the Just Transition Fund (JTF) and the Social Climate Fund (SCF), as well as two schemes set up in response to the Covid crisis: the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) and the temporary Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE). Miro et al. emphasise that “All [the above examples] represent experiences in which the EU stepped up to act as a provider of social protection, either directly to citizens or through supporting the social programs of Member States under stress.”

The spirit of these initiatives may not have been preserved in the recent revisions of the Stability and Growth Pact, but nevertheless calls for European-level stabilising elements such as unemployment insurance, a more substantial budget and exempting green investments from the strict spending rules will only continue to grow (see for example Draghi, 2024).

A more controversial school of thought, but one that we believe to be also worth considering, is the social investment approach (Hemerijck, 2018). This sees social protection not as a cost but as an investment in the future. Little has been said concerning the link with the climate crisis, but there is potential for this vehicle to be reinvented as an institutional enabler of change (Petmesidou & Guillén, 2023).

Finally, open coordination methods have put poverty and social exclusion/inclusion, pensions and healthcare on the European agenda. Although their results are disputed, these methods have enabled exchanges of experience at the structural level and made it possible to learn from other approaches.

Moving forward

To conclude, the EU is not frozen territory, and there have recently been many new initiatives, debates, policies and funding programmes, as well as new legislation. These developments in European social policy open up new and interesting possibilities, but nothing is set in stone: consensus is only temporary, and the innovations are partial and not consolidated in the form of European treaties. It is therefore essential to both build and maintain the pressure on the EU policymakers to progress the nexus between the welfare state and the climate emergency.

In addition to the need to rethink economic, budgetary and taxation rules at the European level, the discussions also need to include concrete policy options for merging the climate and welfare state agendas. The scientific polyphony on the welfare state's ideal shape to address the climate emergency should not hinder the development of policy options and governance ideas. As stated in the introduction, our starting point is that the welfare state needs to both protect people from climate risks and enable them to mitigate those risks. The next section will therefore set out specific recommendations to help achieve this.

Political proposals

Our proposals focus on three main areas. The first deals with existing welfare state arrangements. The idea is to build on and adapt what already exists. Since these programmes are national, the EU's role here is mainly to contribute to and incentivise developments. The second proposes an extension of the welfare state at the European level, even if this obviously interacts with the national level. The third looks more closely at how this can be funded. It proposes that the welfare/climate nexus be placed at the core of European financing and that this should be reflected in the Stability and Growth Pact, the European budget and other investments in the transition.

Greening the institutions of the existing welfare states

In this section we explore a series of options, all based on existing policies and infrastructure. The aim is not to create something completely new, but to build on what already exists in order to provide a pragmatic way of moving forward. We will first consider physical infrastructure, then move on to ways in which existing welfare provision and financial schemes can be optimised for this purpose.

Physical institutions (hospitals, schools, etc.)

The first part of this proposal is to systematically decarbonise all aspects of welfare state infrastructure and processes. Our aim is to initiate a highly practical debate on this under-considered aspect of the climate emergency. Taking the health sector as an example, there are plenty of opportunities for greening that are no different from those in the rest of the economy. The following are just some of the questions that could be asked:

- How can hospitals and other buildings be retrofitted and insulated?
- How can patients and staffs be protected against heatwaves?
- How can health-related mobility and travel be reorganised for reduced emissions and climate impact?
- How can medical equipment be redesigned for lower energy consumption? What type of technology is needed?
- How can drug wastage be reduced?
- What type of food (local, organic, etc.) should be offered to patients?

The health sector currently accounts for an estimated 5.5% of global emissions (Van Daalen et al., 2022). Addressing these questions on a whole-of-EU basis would significantly reduce this figure (see for example Pichler et al., 2019 and Berquin, 2021).

There is nothing inherently revolutionary about this proposal, since it is only logical to take a systemic, planned approach to the transition of this huge sector of the economy. Yet so far, nothing has been done on a systematic basis². A whole-of-EU approach could be coordinated by national ministries (as the health sector is a mainly national, sometimes regional or local, responsibility), but include a clear EU dimension to enable Member States to learn from each others' experiences, since every country faces similar challenges.

This would also provide a good opportunity to strengthen the networks and alliances working on health and climate change, increase their visibility, and apply the useful knowledge they have accumulated on linkages, opportunities and challenges.

In order to achieve this systematic decarbonisation of Member States' health, as well as for example education systems, etc.³ (which are currently already partially covered by Next Generation EU (NGEU) and other programmes), it is essential that this approach be properly funded.

Specifically, we propose the **creation of a platform at European level** to facilitate the sharing of practices and experiences, both successful and unsuccessful, in order to **accelerate the diffusion of innovations for the systematic decarbonisation of welfare state structures and processes.**

Secondly, we propose that **explicit European funding** be made available **for this systematic decarbonisation of welfare state infrastructure** in EU Member States.

Expanding existing welfare schemes to new experiences

The second proposal in this section is to review existing support schemes (financial programmes, financial incentives, etc.) for the purposes of identifying whether and how they could be used to both help reduce emissions and protect people from the climate emergency's risks. Here, too, the emphasis is on building on what is already in place in order to generate solutions to new challenges. It is usually politically easier to reinterpret existing schemes for new purposes than to create new ones from scratch, since there is no need to build a new consensus and majority support.

This relatively straightforward proposal has already been floated in some national contexts. Mireille Elbaum carried out a detailed study of French social protection systems: "*Social protection [...] includes risk coverage mechanisms that can be mobilized, with varying degrees of ease and plasticity, and where appropriate on a massive scale, to deal with the repercussions on individuals or households of the extension of risks of environmental origin.*"

A clear example of these risks would be heatwaves and other extreme weather events, which we know will become increasingly frequent in the future. Eloi Laurent (2021) puts forward the creation of an ecological social protection system for heatwaves, inspired by existing regulations. Even if the legislation is specific to each Member State, there is still room for collective learning and coordination at the EU level. We therefore propose a European regulation that would oblige Member States' social security schemes to cover extreme weather days for the most-affected sectors of the economy (construction, for example), allowing workers to be compensated via existing unemployment schemes.

Another area of intervention is linked to restructuring of industry, and the importance of forward planning. It is clear that the climate emergency will lead to further major changes in the industrial landscape, with the creation of new enterprises and sectors or the restructuring of existing ones.

As argued by IndustriAll and others, it is essential that there be greater (real) participation of workers and workers' representatives in the planning and management of these changes, including through presenting alternative options. This would ensure workers' support for, and ownership of, the transition in the workplace and thereby smooth its implementation. Existing social welfare schemes could facilitate this by providing payments and training to workers during the transition.

Finally, expansion of existing support schemes should also build on experimentation with job guarantees and a Universal Basic Income (UBI). There are already a number of national and local initiatives of this kind, such as the "Territoire zero chômeurs"⁴ in France and Belgium; and at the academic level, too, there has been interest in eco-social variants of the UBI, such as an ecological transition income for personal ecological projects⁵ (Swanton, 2019; Larruffa et al., 2022; Murphy, 2023). The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) has moreover adopted a resolution in favour of a non-compulsory European job guarantee (ETUC, 2023). It is essential that the EU creates space for the further crystallisation of these initiatives, as they will have an important role to play in navigating us through the green transformation.

The political proposals under this point boil down to binding instruments at the EU level to steer national social protection. Specifically, we suggest the creation of **two European directives that oblige Member States to include two new risks in their welfare state schemes: extreme weather events and industrial restructuring.**

We additionally propose that innovative initiatives be incentivised in the form of **EU-level support for, and coordination of, national experiments with job guarantees and eco-social income schemes.** The outcomes of these experiments must inform EU legislation on the topic of a **minimum income** during the next legislature.

Expanding the welfare state to respond to new risks

Our second set of political proposals is in some ways more ambitious. In order to adapt to the climate emergency and simultaneously equip society to mitigate its impacts, a specific new layer of social protection will be necessary, and even crucial. This is based on the premise that there is a massive new risk and the best way to deal with it is collectively. This could be done by national authorities, but the heavy lifting ideally takes place at the European level. Climate risk is in essence borderless, since the effects of Member States' policies, or lack of them, spill over onto other countries. A European approach is therefore necessary, and this forms the main focus of this second set of proposals.

However ambitious this may be, there is already a clear, if limited, (given its funding) precedent in the form of the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund. This was set up in 2006 as part of a new European discourse on social policies in response to widespread fears about the new risks posed by globalisation, as reflected in referendums in France and the Netherlands. Copied from the USA, the Fund intervenes in the event of job losses, essentially by co-financing re-training.

In the words of the Commission, “*The European Globalisation Adjustment Fund for Displaced Workers (EGF) is a special EU instrument to express EU solidarity with European workers or the self-employed that were displaced due to restructuring, and to help them find new jobs*”. The rules of the Fund have been revised twice, and its scope has been greatly expanded in the 2021-2027 budgetary period (Miro et al., 2023).

A similar scheme is needed in order to tackle the effects of the climate emergency. To some extent, this is already happening in the form of the Just Transition Fund (JTF), which was mainly set up to help coal regions manage the social and employment impacts of the coal phase-out⁶. However, the JTF is too limited, both in its scope and its resources, to constitute a real expansion of the welfare state required to respond to the new risks. The Social Climate Fund (SCF), which is due to start in 2026, will come closer to the spirit of this political proposal. It is being set up specifically to protect vulnerable groups from hardship arising from a new emissions trading system for buildings and transport: “*A notable feature of the SCF proposal is that a share of its resources can directly benefit households experiencing energy poverty and citizens with no access to satisfactory public transport options, in the form of temporary direct income support.*” (See Cacciapaglia et al. 2023 for a comparison of the two funds).

In short, we already have all the necessary ingredients to create a new social protection sector that tackles the climate emergency across the EU. We have the justification (a new risk that needs to be tackled it at European level); we have a clear precedent (the Globalisation Fund); and we have an established direction in the form of the Social Climate Fund to support affected individuals directly and the Just Transition Fund to mitigate the regional and sectoral impacts of climate policy.⁷

We need to systematise what already exists and use the momentum to create an ambitious integrated **Social Climate Protection Fund** during the next legislature. This Fund will have a pre-eminent role to play, both in the new regulations proposed above (i.e. social protection for extreme weather events and industrial transition) and in other priority areas such as health, food, etc.

In order to ensure that this new Fund is correctly governed so as to constitute a genuinely new sphere of social protection across the EU, a **European Just Transition Observatory should be set up to monitor and address needs**, and steer implementation.

This identification of these needs requires an intersectional approach, with attention to existing gender, age, racial and other discrimination as well as the risks of creating new risks and inequalities.

Adapting the European financial framework to new realities

Our third set of proposals deals with the EU financial frameworks needed to deliver the above increase of climate emergency/welfare state spending, as the current economic, budgetary and taxation rules are not compatible. Even if seemingly steep, the cost of the proposed expansion of the welfare states needs to be understood in comparison with the much higher cost of inaction, which is growing year by year, as the IPPC reports have shown.

Our discussion on the current state of play included the challenge arising from the constructed trilemma of fiscal consolidation, green spending and welfare state preservation, with the former undermining the two latter pillars. We also laid out that without a change in current European economic, budgetary and taxation rules (Pochet, 2022), it will not be possible to achieve a social and environmentally sustainable transformation. There is growing understanding of this among civil society, trade unions and progressive decision makers. Together, these groups are calling for a changed economic system that enables a socially just transition, and they are right to do so.

There are three potent pillars of support for a new financial approach of this kind:

- **Idea:** There is a consensus among economists that green investments can and should be financed by debt (Pisany-Ferry et al., 2023). This is clearly an investment for future generations and in such cases recourse to debt is recognised as a means of generational equity.
- **Political power:** The Social Climate Fund was voted into being by the European Parliament by a very large majority, including the populist and right-wing parties.
- **Citizen support:** There is a growing consensus at the European and global levels about the link between climate and inequality, and the need for compensation (EIB survey, 2023)

Green and social investments linked to the ongoing transformation should be incentivised, not restricted, as is now the case in the economic governance of the EU.

Next, discussions on the **new multi-annual financial framework should reflect the social and climate challenges** and provide an opportunity to **structurally integrate the Next Generation EU** package within the EU budget.

And finally, specific **central EU funding** is needed to breathe life into the proposed Social Climate Protection Fund discussed above.

Conclusion

In this political brief we have developed European political proposals that can both strengthen national welfare states in their ability to address the climate emergency, and steer actions, bodies and funding at the European level.

The central argument in our Introduction is that actions to reduce carbon footprints are going to have an increasingly wide impact, and that the welfare state remains the best means of managing the social consequences of this by fulfilling a buffer function. With the effects of the climate emergency on European citizens worsening and the required decarbonisation programmes accelerating, we are calling for an urgent evolution of the welfare state and the expansion of its ability to implement change and protect people from the new risks.

We have proposed a range of specific actions: the decarbonisation of national welfare states, funding for a European welfare state sector, new directives, new forms of European coordination, and the establishment of a monitoring body.

This agenda might seem ambitious, but, as discussed above, the last decade has seen significant innovations in EU social policy, including in its interaction with national welfare states. Moreover, the zeitgeist is with us, as shown by a very recent survey by the European Investment Bank (2023), in which respondents say that the transition to a carbon-neutral global economy can only succeed if it also tackles inequality. Equally importantly, the urgent nature of the transition requires massive public support for the European climate action project, and this will only be forthcoming if people both are, and feel themselves to be, socially protected by it at the same time.

Endnotes

¹ This is arguably a false trilemma, since it could be solved by means of a different, more thoughtful macroeconomic approach.

² There is a WHO initiative linking climate with health but only 7 EU members are part of it, and among them only 3 pledged for carbon neutrality in 2050. See <https://www.who.int/initiatives/alliance-for-transformative-action-on-climate-and-health/country-commitments>

³ One other potential area of intervention for systematic decarbonisation of welfare state infrastructure is (social) housing and buildings. With the New European Bauhaus initiative, the EU institutions already have a strong lever in their hand.

⁴ Experiment started in France in 2017 with 10 territories (now 17) and taken up again in Wallonia with 17 territories, which aims to provide work for every unemployed person. See also association of the same name (only in French) on <https://www.tzclld.fr/>

⁵ Being selective, this approach drastically reduces costs compared to a UBI, making it easier to propose a higher income. Another advantage lies in the increased number of people changing their behavior and their consumption and production patterns. Unlike the UBI approach, this one explicitly aims to encourage certain behaviors deemed positive. As with any approach of this type, the question of the limit arises. Should we also consider care projects, for example? Regarding the care dimension, Laruffa et al. (2021) argue that an eco-social BI should "re-shape the focus of social policy on individuals' capability to 'take care of the world', thus shifting the emphasis from economic production to social reproduction and environmental reparation."

⁶ This is very important but reaches a small fraction of those affected by decarbonisation. It covers less than 0.25% of EU employment (Alves Dias et al., 2021).

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GEF's Knowledge Communities are aimed at advancing political and public debates towards a green, socially just Europe, through establishing lasting networks of knowledge production, exchange and dissemination. They are structured around and with a GEF core expert, who delivers a political stock-take as well as new proposals and ideas for discussion with a wider group of actors (i.e. the Knowledge Community). This political brief results out of one of these Knowledge Communities.

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The Green European Foundation (GEF) is a European-level political foundation whose mission is to contribute to a lively European sphere of debate and to foster greater citizen involvement in European politics. GEF strives to mainstream discussions on European policies and politics both within and beyond the Green political family. The foundation acts as a laboratory for new ideas and offers cross-border political education and a platform for cooperation and exchange at the European level.

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